IAMU Research Project FY2015 Final Report

Application of Formal Safety Assessment in Polar Maritime Transportation: Namely Routeing, Emergency Procedures and Human Factors (FORSASS.POMARTRA)

Publication Year 2016
Research Coordinator James R. PARSONS
Research Partners Vladimir E. KUZMIN; Elizabeth K. CLOUTER
Publisher International Association of Maritime Universities (IAMU)
DOI https://doi.org/10.68436/r20150304

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Abstract

Global attention towards the Arctic is increasing, especially in the exploitation of its waters and hence in maritime transportation. Some of the main drivers of this increase include a decline in the coverage and thickness of multi-year ice, longer open water periods during the Arctic summer, increase in demand for renewable and non-renewable resources in the area, improvements in technology, potential gains in business efficiency via shorter shipping routes, and population growth of native and non-native people requiring greater consumer choice and more services. Regardless of the global growth in interest, the Arctic remains a very challenging environment in which to safely and effectively operate as it is a remote, isolated, geographically vast, sparsely populated, environmentally sensitive, climatically harsh, poorly charted and meagerly serviced region with extensive periods of total darkness and waters that are ice covered or iceinfested.

The Arctic presents many hazards and risks to maritime transportation and thus effective risk management is a vital component of safe and successful business operations. To help drive the need for risk management, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), through its International Safety Management (ISM) Code, requires ship owners to establish safeguards against all identified risk. To expand on the work of the IMO in the area of risk management, a Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) concept has been developed and credited with prompting numerous initiatives and regulatory changes. The goal of the FSA is to predetermine need so that measures can be established in an attempt to prevent tragedy. The FSA methodology has several of the characteristics common to many risk management approaches and is a five step process with feedback loops. The steps include hazard identification, risk assessment, risk control options (RCOs), cost-benefit assessment (CBA), and decision-making recommendations. While the FSA methodology is not without its critics, it is felt that with appropriate application tailored to numerous challenges, it is a suitable risk management tool for use in Arctic maritime transportation.

The Canadian Transportation Safety Board (TSB) database was utilized to gain insight on the circumstances surrounding the 157 reported marine occurrences in Canadian waters north of 60°N between the years 2000 and 2014. Of the 157 reported occurrences four were fully investigated and reported on by the TSB. Three of the four reports were completed and released to the public prior to 14 March 2016; the fourth report was released on 15 March. Although the fourth report was not incorporated into the FSA, a review determined that the report’s findings as to causes and contributing factors of the vessel grounding were similar to two of the three earlier reports in which vessel grounding was the outcome. In these three vessel grounding events the TSB reported that poor bridge resource management was practiced, safety management systems were lacking, bridge equipment was not effectively used, and crew were fatigued. In comparing Canadian Arctic shipping statistics with those of other Arctic nations, it was found that the biggest risk to vessels sailing in Arctic ice covered water was related to vessel damage as a result of contact with ice or grounding. Throughout the research, it was observed that there is room for improvement in the way that data are collected and presented both in Canada and elsewhere. With respect to gaps in the current education and training requirements stipulated by the IMO through various Conventions and Codes, there appear to be none that would have contributed to the four occurrences investigated by the TSB as noted above. In addition, it was noted from interviews with industry advisors, all having experience working in Arctic waters, that the current status of IMO education and training requirements for Arctic water navigation is sufficient. However, it was stressed that experience and mentoring were critical to safe and efficient shipping operations in Arctic ice covered waters. Also, it was noted that industry will benefit from an IMO model course with more detailed curriculum on ice navigation. Current training mostly address deck officers while training of engine officers should also be a part of the ship readiness to operate in polar waters. It is expected that an IMO Polar Code ice navigation course will be in effect as of 2018.

While there were limitations with respect to available data, time, and resources, the FSA recommended three RCOs for adoption and implementation. These included an ice navigation training course, ice radar system, and high power searchlights suited for extreme weather conditions for a total combined cost of approximately USD $134K. The FSA did not calculate the probability of a vessel grounding in the Arctic prior to or after the implementation of the RCOs and made the assumption that implementation of the RCOs would prevent an oil spill. In the event that an oil spill, independent of size, were to occur in the Arctic, a 2016 net present value of the cleanup cost was calculated based on a 5% annual interest rate, a 2009 global average total spill cost of USD $67,275, and a 2006 North American average cleanup cost of USD $24K/tonne, and that cleanup costs in the Arctic could be in the range of ten times that in the south. Using these figures and hypothetical assumptions, the NPV could be estimated approximately between USD $400K and $950K per tonne.

Several recommendations are provided for the application of FSA in Arctic shipping. Not all of these recommendations were applied to the FSA as some challenges were insurmountable in light of the time and resources available. While the recommendations are not listed in an overall order of importance, they highlight that a FSA for Arctic shipping will be a time-intensive venture which, depending on its nature and extensiveness, could take several years. In addition, due to the vast diversity and sensitivity of the entire Arctic region, regional focus is critical.

Keywords

Risk, Arctic, Maritime, Navigation, FSA

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