Executive summary

Over the last decade, a significant research effort has been done in the area of unmanned and autonomous sailing. The design of a reliable autonomous navigation system is one of the largest remaining challenges in that area. Currently, the systems are far from capable of fully replacing a competent human navigator. This comes in addition to the inherent distrust that the general public has towards fully autonomous systems. This research looks into an alternative to autonomous navigation, remote navigation, in which a trained human operator controls and monitors a ship from a Remote Operating Centre (ROC) from shore.

There are currently several examples of ROC’s working in practice, in most cases as a trail, proof of concept or as part of research. However, the Belgium company Seafar are operating several inland ships from their ROC in Antwerp, Belgium. Regardless of their success, there are still many questions that remain with regards to the operating of ships from an ROC.

This research answers the following research question and subquestions: What are the needs in terms of skills and equipment for a remote operating centre operator to safely monitor and control a ship?

This research question is subsequently split into 4 sub questions: What is the minimum equipment a ROC operator needs to safely operate a ship? Are the current skills that bridge officers have enough to safely operate a remove vessel with help of the equipment determined in question 1? What changes can or should be made to the training of future bridge or ROC officers to support the change from manned ships to unmanned ships. How can a model vessel be created that can be controlled from an ROC?

To answer the questions, several experiments are conducted to determine the equipment that an ROC operator would need. The current curriculum and the training needs of the ROC operators is investigated with a literature study.

To answer the first sub question, two sets of experiments are conducted. In the first set of experiments, experienced seafarers were asked to complete several scenarios in the simulator. Their actions were observed and they were asked questions to provide insight into the equipment they used and what equipment they feel they would need as a remote operator. Here they were asked to make a distinction between information that they felt would be required at all times and information that they would like to have access to, but did not need visible at all times. These results provide valuable insight into how information overload can be avoided for the operator.

A second set of experiments looked at the challenge from a different angle. Here, the bridge procedures guide (International Chamber of Shipping, 2022) was used as a basis to see if an OOW would be able to comply with the procedures and requirements of safe operation mention in this guide. The participants were asked to sail a relatively simple route on a simulator during which they encountered some traffic, infrastructure and some hazards. They had to safely complete the scenario with limited equipment available and the outside view blocked off.

An increasingly complex scenario with more elements to consider leads to a wish for more information from the operator. The first scenario, encountering one ship in open water, could be completed safely with a radar and a display which shows information about SOG, STW, a heading, rate of turn and a rudder indicator. This information would be enough to monitor and control the ship while it is in open water with limited traffic. In this case, it would be possible to have a set up

with only two screens. However, the outside view should always be accessible to the operator for additional safety. This is confirmed by the second set of experiments during which the basic operations were safely conducted, however, small hard to identify objects were missed as they were not visible on the ECDIS and not investigated enough when observed on the radar.

To look into the training a literature review is conducted. The skills required for an ROC operator have been investigated several times and DNV have already written a standard of competence for remote operators.

From the research, it becomes clear that most industry experts feel that a trained officer of the watch should be able to safely navigate a ship with the standard equipment. However, there are many suggestions for some additional knowledge, mostly towards the digital systems and connections. For example, ROC operators should have some knowledge regarding cyber security and how to handle in case of a cyber security attack. Additionally, the operator should have a basic understanding of how the information from the ship is send to the ROC and how the different systems in the ROC work together.

The suggestions from literature and research match up very well with the DNV standard for the competence of remote control centre operators. If one were to set up a course for remote operators, this would be a good place to start.

In the conclusion of this report, we look at the design of the ROC. From Chapter 3, it is clear that in most cases the ROC is designed to mostly look like a ship’s bridge. This is understandable, as this is what the ROC is based on. Much of the information that is displayed in the ROC is also displayed on the bridge, and in many cases the controls of the bridge are rather standard. Therefore, this design will not step very far away from the design of the bridge, however, there are some design choices that can still be made.

It would be beneficial to be able to set the ROC to different modes. A basic mode, for when the ship is, for example, in transit in open water, a busy water mode and a mooring and manoeuvring mode. That way it is easy to display information that the operator requires without overloading them with information that is not needed. Additionally, it should be possible for operators to add information that they wish. That means that at all times, all information from the ship should be available, but not all information needs to be displayed at all times.

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